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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Respondent, ) 
vs. ] 
RONNIE S. BROOKS, 
Defendant/Appellant. ] 
i Case No. 900540-CA 
i Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment for the 
crimes of aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and 
aggravated sexual assault, a first degree felony. Counsel herein 
was appointed after the case was "poured over" to the Utah Court 
of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I WAS THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY 
VIOLATED? 
POINT II WHETHER THE REASONABLE DOUBT 
INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT OVER 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION FAILED TO 
ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE CONCEPT OF 
REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE JURY. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. 
STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides as follows: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and 
district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall 
have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be 
confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for 
his defence. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides as 
follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the 
accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy 
thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses 
against him, to have compulsory 
process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial 
jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have 
been committed, and the right to 
appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final 
judgment, be compelled to advance 
money or fees to secure the rights 
herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence 
against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her 
husband, nor a husband against his 
wife, nor shall any person be twice 
put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
STATEMENT OF THE QAgE 
1. Nature of the Case. Defendant was convicted of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony. The Court sentenced the defendant 
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to the indeterminate terms of from five years to life on those 
convictions. From that judgment and commitment, the defendant 
filed this appeal. 
2. Course of Proceedings. Defendant was convicted of 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, and aggravated sexual 
assault, a first degree felony. The Court sentenced the defendant 
to the indeterminate terms of from five years to life on those 
convictions. From that judgment and commitment, the defendant 
filed this appeal. 
After the case was in the appellate court, the Court of 
Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for the purpose of 
taking evidence to determine whether or not the defendant's right 
to testify was violated at the trial court. A hearing on that 
issue occurred on July 17, 1991, before the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya. Those proceedings have been filed with the Court of 
Appeals, and that issue is before this Court. 
3. Disposition of Trial Court. On defendant's 
convictions for two first degree felonies, the Court sentenced the 
defendant to the indeterminate term of from 5 years to life in the 
Utah State Prison. On remand from this Court for evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court determined that the defendant's right to 
testify was not violated, and issued such an order. 
4. Relevant Facts. The victim testified that she 
encountered a man in the late afternoon near her apartment. The 
man was black, carrying a child on his shoulders, wearing a green 
t-shirt and jeans, and had an unusual hair style. [Record, pp. 
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70-72, 96] He introduced himself to the victim as "Brooks" or 
"Brock" and said something to the effect that he could "shine some 
of his love to me." [R. , pp. 73] The victim identified the 
defendant in the courtroom as the man she encountered that 
afternoon. [R., p. 70] 
In the early hours of the following morning, the victim 
was awakened by a man bending over her "kissing her." [R., p. 74] 
He had his hand behind her neck and was touching her breast and 
buttocks underneath her robe. [R., p. 75] The man indicated that 
she should be quiet and get up and go with him. id. The victim 
began struggling and screaming, Id. The man struck the victim's 
daughter. He held the victim by the hair and struck her 
approximately a dozen times in the face with his hand. [R. , p. 
76] The man also kicked the victim in the face several times. 
[R., p. 77] The victim's face was yellow and swollen for over a 
month and she had a black eye. [R. , pp. 84, 120] Photographs 
were submitted of the victim which were taken the day following 
the attack. [R., p. 83] 
According to the victim's testimony, the assailant also 
made several threats to the effect of "you're dead", "you and your 
kids are dead", "I'm going to kill you", "your kids are dead", 
"this is what the coke will do for you, bitch." [R., pp. 77, 1. 
9-12]. The assailant then went to the door, unlocked it and left, 
leaving the door open. [R., p. 77] The victim described the man 
as wearing a greenish t-shirt, Levis, and having an unusual 
braided hair style. [R., pp. 80-81] 
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The police arrived shortly thereafter. After talking with 
the victim, Officer Knight testified that he went to apartment no. 
3 and spoke with Walt, a witness to the victim's afternoon 
encounter with "Brook" or "Brock". Walt directed Officer Knight 
to the defendant's apartment. [R., p. 186.] The police were 
admitted into the defendant's apartment, where they discovered him 
and arrested him. Officer Knight testified that defendant was 
wearing a green t-shirt. [R., pp. 187-188] The defendant was 
hand-cuffed, brought to the police car and placed in front of the 
headlights. [R., p. 189] The victim and her roommate were 
brought to the area. Both the victim and her roommate identified 
the defendant as the assailant. [R., pp. 81, 148, 217-281] The 
State also presented the testimony of the victim's roommate, 
Shannon Radford. Her testimony substantially corroborated the 
victim's testimony. [R., pp. 140-160] 
Additionally, she testified that she watched the assailant 
leave the apartment from the window. When he was about 15 feet 
away, he stopped, turned, and looked at her. She described his 
hair style and the green t-shirt. [R., pp. 144-146] This witness 
also identified the defendant in the courtroom after viewing 
photos taken of him shortly after the arrest. [R., p. 149-51] 
At the remand hearing, the defendant testified that he 
wanted to testify but was prevented from testifying by his trial 
counsel. [Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 4-11] Co-trial 
counsel for the defendant testified that the defendant wanted to 
testify and had maintained he wanted to testify throughout the 
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trial. [Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 13] He further 
testified that it was trial counsel's belief that the defendant 
ought not testify and indicated that the defendant was not happy 
with that advice. [Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 14] Counsel 
also testified at the hearing that trial counsel did not "let him 
testify" and he acquiesced in trial counsel's advice not to 
testify because he had no option, as trial counsel had indicated 
they were not going to "put him on the stand". [Tr. of Hearing, 
July 17, 1991, p. 15] Lead trial counsel testified at the hearing 
that when it became time to decide whether or not the defendant 
should testify, she expressed to the defendant her opinion that 
the State's case was weak and the defendant could add nothing, and 
that based upon that advice, he said "ok". [R., pp. 21-22] She 
further testified that the reason two lawyers represented Mr. 
Brooks at the trial was not due to the nature of the charges, but 
because "Mr. Brooks was a difficult client", and that co-counsel 
was there as a go between who had direct contact with Mr. Brooks 
during the trial. [Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 22-23] Lead 
counsel also testified that no time had been spent preparing Mr. 
Brooks to testify. [Tr. of Hearing, July 17, 1991, p. 24] 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The defendant in a criminal trial, as created by the Utah 
Constitution, has the individual right to testify. This right is 
different than and more expanded than the federal counterpart as 
contained in the Sixth Amendment. This personal fundamental right 
cannot be presumed to have been waived by a "silent record". In 
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order to find a waiver, the trial court must have a personal 
dialogue with the defendant regarding that right out of the 
presence of a jury. 
The reasonable doubt instruction as given by the Court did 
not adequately define "reasonable doubt". 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO TESTIFY AS 
CONTAINED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 12 WAS 
VIOLATED WHEN THE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
TESTIFY, DESPITE HIS REQUEST TO HIS 
LAWYERS TO TESTIFY AND WAIVER CANNOT 
BE PRESUMED FROM A SILENT RECORD 
BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT 
INVOLVED. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 
U.S. 444, 49-52, (1987) held that "an accused's right to present 
his own version of events in his own words is even more 
fundamental to a personal defense than the right to self-
representation ." 
This Supreme Court in Rock located that right in the due 
process clause and the compulsory process clause of the Sixth 
Amendment. It also indicated that it is a "necessary corollary to 
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled testimony." 
Since the "right to testify" is one of those "fundamental rights", 
that right to testify should be deemed waived only when there is 
record evidence demonstrating "an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Johnson v. Zurbst, 
304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). 
The Federal Constitution, as articulated in Rock, supra., 
found the origin of the right to testify in the Sixth Amendment 
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compulsory process clause. Under federal analysis, pursuant to 
Rock, the United States Supreme Court held that a person's right 
to present evidence through his "own words was more fundamental 
than even the right to counsel," as well as other known 
fundamental rights. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia, in Boyd v. U.S., 48 Cr.L., 1459 (1991) explained the 
federal analysis of the right to testify, pursuant to Rock. In 
Boyd, defendant did not testify, but there was no "on the record" 
dialogue between the defendant and the court regarding waiver. 
That court held that "the defendant's right to testify in a 
criminal trial is a fundamental and personal right that can only 
be waived by the defendant." 
Requiring that the trial court "engage in an on the record 
discussion with the defendant to ensure that she has knowingly 
waived her right to testify." 
Other state courts have followed this requirement. See 
example, People v. Curtis, 681 P.2d 503, 514 (Colo. S.Ct. 1984) 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Buonadonna, 48 Cr.L., 
1377 held that a Bruton violation (incriminating unredactable 
statement by a non-testifying co-defendant) was not of the 
fundamental variety, and therefore, did not require an "on the 
record" dialogue between the defendant and the court, and may be 
presumed from silence or may be waived by trial counsel. 
The important inquiry appears to be whether or not the 
right to testify is of the fundamental variety. If it is of that 
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fundamental variety, then it may not be presumed from silence or 
waived by counsel, but the court must assure itself, as it does 
with other fundamental rights, that the defendant understands and 
is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to testify. 
Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in 
relevant parts: "In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have 
the right to appear and defend in person. . . ." The Utah 
Supreme Court, in State v. LaRocco, 135 Ut.Adv.Rptr. 16 (1990), in 
ruling on a search and seizure issue, held that the Utah 
Constitution may provide a "somewhat different construction than 
its federal counterpart, based upon the context of the two 
documents." 
The federal constitution and the Rock, supra, analysis 
derives its viability from the Sixth Amendment and the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Utah Constitution is 
specific. Its language is specific and relies specifically to 
criminal defendants, in Article I, Section 12. 
Under the Utah Constitutional analysis, the defendant's 
personal right to testify was infringed and could not have been 
waived by counsel, and this case should be remanded for a new 
trial on that basis. 
POINT II THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION 
FAILED TO ADEQUATELY DEFINE THE 
CONCEPT OF REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THE 
JURY. 
An appeal challenging the trial court's refusal to give 
jury instructions presents a question of law. Therefore, no 
deference need be given by the reviewing court to the trial 
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judge's decision. State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331 (Utah 
Ct.App. 1990). The trial court in this case probably did not err 
in refusing to give the reasonable doubt instruction submitted by 
the defense. R. 263-64. In making her request, the defense 
relied on State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147-49 (Utah 1989), in 
which a majority of the court adopted the analysis set forth by 
Justice Stewart in his dissent in State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 
1380-82 (Utah 1989). R. 263. 
The court in Johnson held that an instruction which 
defined reasonable doubt in terms of making important or weighty 
decisions in the juror's own lives was inappropriate because it 
tends to "diminish and trivialize the constitutionally required 
burden-of-proof standard." 774 P.2d at 1148. The court further 
held it impermissible to instruct that reasonable doubt is not 
merely a possibility. The court reasoned that under some 
circumstances, a possibility very well may constitute reasonable 
doubt. Whether or not it does depends upon the likelihood of the 
possibility. Id. 
The instruction given by the trial court in this case is 
as follows: 
All presumptions of law, independent of 
evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a 
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of 
a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is 
satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an 
acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is 
upon the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
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certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a 
doubt that is based on reason and one which is 
reasonable in view of all the evidence. It must 
be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the 
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are 
bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would 
entertain, and it must arise from the evidence or 
the lack of evidence in this case. 
Applying the standards set forth in Johnson above, the Utah 
Court of Appeals, in State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328, 1331-33 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990) upheld an identically worded instruction. 
Quoting Justice Stewart's dissent in Ireland, the court held it 
permissible to instruct that a "fanciful or wholly speculative 
possibility ought not to defeat proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. at 1332 (quoting State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1382 (Utah 
1989) (Stewart J., dissenting)). The court also held that an 
instruction need not specifically negate the "weighty decisions of 
life" analogy struck down in Johnson. Simply omitting language of 
that type was sufficient. Id. 
However, an argument could be made requesting the court to 
reconsider the approval of the instruction in Pedersen in light of 
the failure of the instruction to adequately define reasonable 
doubt. In Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. — (1990), the United States 
Supreme Court reversed a capital homicide conviction because the 
reasonable doubt instruction was constitutionally defective. The 
court in Cage held that an instruction defining reasonable doubt 
in terms of a "grave uncertainty," "an actual substantial doubt" 
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or a "moral certainty" suggested a higher degree of doubt necessary 
for acquittal, thus allowing jurors to find guilt on a degree of 
proof below that required under the Due Process Clause. 
A broad interpretation of Cage supports the argument that 
"reasonable doubt" is not self-defining. The Court in Cage 
reviewed the instruction by construing it as a whole and as jurors 
could have understood it in its entirety. By rejecting the 
definitions of "moral certainty" and "actual substantial doubt", 
and then striking down the entire instruction, the court was 
implicitly stating that due process requires an instruction which 
provides a meaningful, accurate definition of reasonable doubt. 
An adequate definition of reasonable doubt is vital if it is to 
serve its function as a "prime instrument for reducing the risk of 
convictions resting on factual error." Cage, supra. (quoting In 
re Winship. 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970)). 
The instruction in Cage was similar to the one used by the 
trial court in this case. Both repeat the usage of the term 
"reasonable doubt" in order to define the concept of reasonable 
doubt. These instructions amount to nothing more than the 
statement, "reasonable doubt is a doubt which is reasonable." 
Consequently, the instruction given in this case fails to give the 
jury any guidance. It does not provide a meaningful definition of 
the phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" and is therefore defective. 
Additionally, the evidence in this case consisted almost 
entirely of an eyewitness identification of the appellant at a 
show-up and a subsequent in-court identification where appellant 
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was the only black man in the room. Because the jury was made 
aware of the inherent unreliability of these types of eyewitness 
identifications, had they been adequately instructed on the concept 
of reasonable doubt, they may well have acquitted appellant of the 
charge. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant is entitled to a new 
trial and the case should be remanded for a new trial. 
DATED this day of October, 1991. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of October, 1991, a 
true and correct copy of Appellant's Brief was mailed, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
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(a) persons charged with a capital offense 
when there is substantial evidence to support the 
charge; or 
(b) persons charged with a felony while on pro-
bation or parole, or while free on bail awaiting 
trial on a previous felony charge, when there is 
substantial evidence to support the new felony 
charge; or 
(c) persons charged with a crime, as defined by 
statute, when there is substantial evidence to 
support the charge and the court finds by clear 
and convincing evidence that the person would 
constitute a substantial danger to self or any 
other person or to the community or is likely to 
flee the jurisdiction of the court if released on 
bail. 
(2) Persons convicted of a crime are bailable pend-
ing appeal only as prescribed by law. 1989 
Sec . 9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel pun-
ishments.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines 
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual 
punishments be inflicted. Persons arrested or impris-
oned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
1896 
Sec. 10. [Trial by jury.] 
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall re-
main inviolate. In courts of general jurisdiction, ex-
cept in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight ju-
rors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall con-
sist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall 
be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the ju-
rors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be 
waived unless demanded. 1896 
Sec. 11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or reputa-
tion, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary 
delay; and no person shall be barred from prosecuting 
or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a 
party. 1896 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, 
to demand the nature and cause of the accusation 
against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his 
own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the atten-
dance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been com-
mitted, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judg-
ment, be competed to advance money or fees to se-
cure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a 
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her hus-
band, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any 
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
1896 
Sec. 13. [Prosecution by information or indict-
ment — Grand jury.] 
Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by 
indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after 
examination and commitment by a magistrate, un-
less the examination be waived by the accused with 
the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or 
without such examination and commitment. The for-
mation of the grand jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by the Legislature. 
1949 
Sec. J 4, [Unreasonable searches forbidden — 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable 
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no 
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 
seized. 1898 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — 
Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the 
freedom of speech or of the press. In all criminal pros-
ecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the 
matter charged as libelous is true, and was published 
with good motives, and for justifiable ends, the party 
shall b$ acquitted; and the jury shall have the right 
to determine the law and the fact. i896 
Sec. 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Excep-
tion.] 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 1896 
Sec. 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.] 
All ejections shaft be free, and no power, civil or j 
military, shall at any time interfere to prevent the 
free exercise of the right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time . 
of war, may vote at their post of duty, in or out of the 
State, under regulations to be prescribed by law. 
Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Im- 1 
pairing contracts.] J 
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law im- j 
pairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed. J 
1896 
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.] 
Treason against the State shall consist only in 
levying war against it, or in adhering to its enemies 
or in giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be 
convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act. i s * 
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil 
power.] , 
The military shall be in strict subordination to the 
civil power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be 
quartered in any house without the consent of the 
owner; nor in time of war except in a manner to be 
prescribed by law. i*# 
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.] 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall 
have bfeen duly convicted, shall exist within this 
State. 1896 
~-
r i 
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.] v^i 
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for 
public use without just compensation. 1896 
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] M 
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably a n y * 
franchise, privilege or immunity. 189* B 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the 
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the se-
curity of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in 
any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in 
time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their per-
sons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — 
Due process of law and just compensation 
clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment 
or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising 
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor 
shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor shall private property 
be taken for public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial 
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been 
previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of 
the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have com-
pulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT VII 
[Trial by jury in civil cases.] 
In Suits at common law, where the value in contro-
versy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by 
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, 
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law. 
AMENDMENT VIH 
[Bail — Punishment.] 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
[Rights retained by people.] 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain 
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage 
others retained by the people. 
AMENDMENT X 
[Powers reserved to states or people.] 
The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, 
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the peo-
ple. 
AMENDMENT XI 
[Suits against states — Restriction of judicial 
power.] 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United ; 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
Subjects of any Foreign State. 
AMENDMENT XII J 
[Election of President and Vice-President.] j 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states,,! 
and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, 1 
one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of J 
the same state with themselves; they shall name in ^ 
their ballots the person voted for as President, and in J 
distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-Presi-| 
dent, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons J 
voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as 1 
Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each,-J 
which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit 1 
sealed to the seat of the Government of the United j 
States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The>M 
President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the3 
Senate and House of Representatives, open all &eM 
certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—TheJ 
person having the greatest number of votes for Pres1 'M 
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a ^'M 
jority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and« 
if no person have such majority, then from the V&'M 
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three* 
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